2 will take principles to be propositions of a certain kind. Jerry allows that they can be so understood, though he remains non-committal, wishing to make his Thesis as robust as possible by being neutral regarding as many meta-ethical disputes as possible. It will be seen that I do think that its understanding and its fate depend on some issues in theoretical ethics. I will say, and let us take it as a terminological stipulation, that true propositions express facts.
I think that we can assume that whatever else reflecting or being 'responsive to facts' means it is inconsistent with being insensitive to facts, where insensitivity is defined by the following condition:
Insensitivity Condition: A principle, P, is insensitive to some fact, F, if and only if [Not-(if P then F) and Not-(if P then not-F) ].
If double negation does not hold for the relevant domain, an additional clause has to be added to the definition to the effect that Not-(if F then P).
Basic principles, according to Jerry, are insensitive to all facts, other than those which are expressed by principles which can be 'reasonably thought to support' them.
It seems sensible to assume that the Thesis is meant to be neutral regarding which principles, which are not themselves logical or conceptual truths, are true.
2 This assumption, which seems consistent with Jerry's intentions, enables one to use -in discussing the Thesis -examples of principles, without worrying that the point they are meant to illustrate is undermined by the fact that they are (at least in the view of some readers) false.
One difficulty in understanding the Thesis is that on some assumptions it is either too readily confirmed or too readily refuted. Too readily -meaning in ways which deny it the interest it may hold, indeed the interest it may hold whether or not it is true. For example, if one accepts, with most writers in meta-ethics, that the normative supervenes on the nonnormative (without being reducible to it) then the thesis is readily seen to be false: Take any principle, P, which is not a logical or conceptual truth. According to the supervenience thesis, if P, then there is a non-normative fact, F, such that (P supervenes on F, and F). Hence P is not insensitive to F. Hence the Thesis is false. This is another insensitivity assumption: regarding any principle (which is not a logical or conceptual truth) the Thesis is true whether or not that principle is true.
I am assuming that Jerry is rightly relying on normative properties not being identical with natural
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636797 By Jerry's Thesis the proposition that fidelity is a virtue expresses a fact to which the promising principle, or some other principle to which it is responsive, must be insensitive.
According to the virtue theorists I am imagining into being, both the promising principle and whatever other principles it responds to, are sensitive to the fact that fidelity is a virtue. This threatens to refute the Thesis. No ultimate factual dependence Thesis (NFD): A principle, P, is true only if [if P is sensitive to some facts (i.e. to the truth of some factual proposition) then it is also sensitive to another principle which is not sensitive to any facts (the specified exclusions allowed)].
NFD is not about the way one holds or endorses principles. It states a condition which must be met if any fact-sensitive principle is true. I will assume (as Jerry implies regarding his Thesis) that 4 Some may prefer alternative formulations of ET. I believe that the differences do not matter to my purpose.
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I say ultimately because it may do so through the mediation of other principles.
6 the principle is not trivially true, i.e that the following inference schema From (If p then Oq)
infer O(p→q) is not valid. 6 To start with I will consider the Endorsement Thesis on its own. I should repeat that my aim is not to assess Jerry's Thesis. Clearly both the ET and the NFD are reconstructions, and it would be wrong to impute them to Jerry. They are theses suggested by his text and provoking the following reflections.
Epistemic observations
The clear-headed person knows why she endorses the principles she does, and sometimes she has factual reasons for her endorsement of them. What kind of reasons are they? Since they are reasons for endorsement they appear to be epistemic reasons. 7 I will assume that we are talking of epistemic reasons, and that the ET is one necessary condition for such endorsement to be warranted.
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Consider the following exchange:
Friend: you ought not to do that to Jim. But I do not think that G, belief that G, or warranted belief that G is needed to warrant my belief that I ought not to do that to Jim (because it would hurt him). In fact my belief that I
should not hurt Jim by doing this to him appears to me, and is, much more secure than my belief that G. The latter belief depends on a complex theoretical issue (e.g., whether particularism is false). And while I believe that G, I certainly do not, and should not, regard that as an essential part of the case for my belief that I should not hurt Jim by doing this being warranted.
Should one say that while I need not rely on G I am tacitly relying on there being some principle, perhaps one which is shared by all sides to the theoretical dispute? To say this is to escape to a fantasy world. I have no idea about any such principle, not even of the possibility of such a principle, and I certainly do not rely on any.
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And this is also the reason for not taking 'hurt' to express a normative concept. It is not related to reasons in the right way.
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Note that G is not committd to NFD.
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Worse still, the whole line of reasoning confuses necessary conditions for the truth of a belief with epistemic reasons warranting it. As mentioned, G may be a necessary condition for the truth of my belief, but is not my reason for it. Nor can it be, given that my degree of confidence in it is less, much less, than my confidence that I should not do that act for it will hurt Jim. Similarly, that sometimes one ought not to hurt people is a necessary condition for the truth of the proposition that I should not hurt Jim in this way now. But while that I ought not hurt Jim in that way now is a reason to believe in the existential generalisation, the generalisation gives little credence to the particular proposition about it being the case that I ought not hurt Jim in this way now.
I am merely pointing to the fact that I am epistemically in good order in my belief about
Jim, rather than arguing for it, for I take it to be a simple case. It is analogous to being (sometimes) warranted in believing that E 1 caused E 2 without believing in any causal law to back it up. My point is merely that the fact that the truth of some normative proposition presupposes the truth of another normative proposition does not in itself establish that the latter proposition need have any role in establishing that belief in the first is epistemically warranted.
The example which led to these observations was of a particular proposition, not of a principle. If the thesis does not apply to particular propositions there is little prospect that it applies to principles. And indeed it is not hard to illustrate the same remarks by reference to principles. E.g. some believe that doctors have a duty to use medical resources at their disposal to secure the health of their patients, but they also believe that they do not have a duty, not the same duty, not one with the same stringency, to acquire additional medical resources for that purpose. According to them a doctor may be unable to plead tiredness (which does not affect his effectiveness) as a reason for not looking after a patient whose life would be at risk if not attended to. But the same doctor does not have an obligation to take on an extra job in order to have more money to provide the same patient with the medication he needs, and which he does not currently possess. According to such people doctors' obligation to their patients is limited to the medical resources they possess. But most people who have such a view will not hold it in virtue of a fact-insensitive principle. They are unlikely to know any principle which could serve, yet their belief may be in good epistemic order. 
A brief word about explanations
All of this may suggest that what Jerry had in mind all along has more to do with explanations than with epistemic reasons. While the ET suggested the epistemic interpretation, on which I commented above, the NFD suggests a concern with a condition for there being an explanatory relationship between a factual and a normative proposition. It suggests that a factual proposition can explain a normative proposition only with the aid of another normative proposition. The conversation can go on and on. The point I am making is that (a) it is conducted mainly in factual terms, and (b) that, typically, (implied) porous generalisations ('he is only a child'
suggesting that sometimes one should not treat children like that) are mixed with analogies in the search for understanding. Understanding can be gained or enhanced both by generalisations and by analogies, and much of the search for understanding is conducted with reference to facts.
None of this is denied by Jerry. Nor do I deny that for some purposes explanations of a more specific kind are needed. Causal explanations, for example, are indispensible for some purposes, but not for the explanation of principles of justice, and so on. More relevant to our purpose is the fact that if there are basic normative principles, i.e. ones which do not reflect any facts which do not feature in such explanations, they, the explanations, are incomplete in the sense that there is something more which can be explained and is not, or that there is something more which can feature in some explanation and does not. But then, every explanation is incomplete in that sense. There is always more that can be explained, and more which can be used to explain, even when there is no reason to offer any further explanations on the occasion.
On the role of Basic Principles
Arguably NFD gets closest to the Thesis which Jerry had in mind, and it is time to turn to it. To remind ourselves, it says:
No ultimate factual dependence Thesis (NFD): A principle, P, is true only if [if P is sensitive to some facts (i.e. to the truth of some factual proposition) then it is also sensitive to another principle which is not sensitive to any facts (the specified exclusions allowed)].
There are at least two distinct ways in which principles (that is, ought propositions) can violate NFD, corresponding to two ways in which principles can be sensitive to facts. First, a fact can be (part of) the reason for a principle (e.g. young people are denied full control over their affairs because their knowledge is limited). Second, a fact can be a condition for the application of a principle (e.g. this principle applies only in Britian). Hence, NFD yields two derived theses:
The Factual Reasons Thesis (FRT): a fact F can be a reason for a principle only if there is another principle, for which no facts are reasons, and which directly or through the mediation of further principles determines that F is such a reason.
The Scope Limitation Thesis (SLT):
A fact F can set a condition for the application of a principle only if there is another principle, of unrestricted application, which determines that F is a condition for the application of the first principle.
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The reasons for a principle, referred to in FRT, are practical reasons for those subject to it to act as it specifies, and such other considerations as are required to establish that not only do they have reasons so to act, but that they ought to do so. FRT raises difficult questions, which can -some of them -be mentioned, but to resolve them will take us too far afield. Possibly, FRT is true. Since the reasons FRT refers to are practical reasons it may well be a conceptual truth. A familiar, though controversial, thesis says that only what is valuable provides practical reasons. If so then if some fact, F, is a practical reason for some principle, P, then that thesis entails that F has some value. Assume that V (a normative proposition) specifies what value F has. It would follow that if F is a reason for P then so is V, and that, with some additional plausible assumptions, is sufficient to make FRT true, conceptually true.
There is a simpler argument that it is a conceptual truth. FRT presupposes a classification of all properties into normative and factual. Wherein lies the difference? One familiar view takes it to be that instantiations of normative properties, and only they, are reason-providing (in and of themselves). If this is so then FRT is a conceptual truth. It relies on nothing other than the nature of the (second order) property of being a normative property. 
I leave this matter and turn to SLT. Many principles are subject to a condition: one ought to Φ, but only if conditions C obtain. In such cases the principles are sensitive to the condition: if it is true that one ought to Φ, as the principle dictates, conditions C obtain. C may be a factual or a normative condition. Either way it sets a limit to the application of the principle.
Whenever the application of a principle is subject to a limit or condition one may ask why is the principle so limited? If C is also a reason for the principle then that and the explanation of why it is so, is the answer. Suppose however that C is not the reason for the principle. In such cases, it is natural to suggest, the reply will itself be a principle of greater generality, which is not conditional on C. It may itself be of limited applicability, but, unless its condition is its reason, the question 'Why?' arises again, and stops only when we reach a perfectly unconditional principle or one conditioned only by its reason. Or, so it may be natural to think, and that thought is a generalisation of SLT.
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Natural as this suggestion is it has to be rejected. It ignores the lessons I pointed to in Section
One. The suggestion's appeal is in the thought, which I accept, that normative principles can be explained, that the domain of reasons generally is intelligible, that there are no brute facts in it.
However, as we saw in the first section, explanations need not proceed by derivation from one principle to another. They can, and commonly do, appeal to other normative facts. Still, even so, SLT is not challenged. Where there is an explanation it will point to a principle of the required form. There will always be a true proposition, perhaps having the form: If values or reasons for action depend on necessary features of human beings then one ought to follow only principles which reflect or respond to those necessary features. So, SLT remains intact, but the availability of SLT-satisfying principles should not be allowed to disguise the fact that the grounds for the truth of this and other principles, and the explanation of their truth, lie in the argument, 15 whatever it is, which makes value conditioned by such features. Explanations, theoretical explanations, of moral principles will -quite appropriately -continue to be expressed in the traditional way, i.e. by saying that they do depend on facts about human nature.
Conclusion
To sum up: Jerry seems to be advancing two theses. ET and NFD are one possible interpretation of them. ET seems to be mistaken. Epistemic reasons and the explanations of true normative propositions need not be insensitive to non-normative facts.
Some people will think that even if true this is irrelevant to the core of Jerry's Thesis, which is not about everyday epistemic reasons and explanations, but about theoretical ones.
However, theoretical reasoning is sensitive to all our warranted beliefs. All of them may affect the case for or against any theoretical thesis. Hence the failure of ET is relevant to theoretical reflection.
NFD on the other hand, seems to be true. My only worry is that some may mistake the reasons for its truth, and therefore the role it plays in practical thought, assigning to it a fundamental role in arguments for moral or other principles. Such arguments depend primarily not on principles, but on facts about value, virtue, the nature of normative thought, and of rational agency, and such like. Facts about the nature of normative thought probably render NFD true. But its truth should not lead to thinking that fact-insensitive principles play a major role in our practical thought. Principles which are specific and informative enough to be useful guides for action probably are fact-sensitive. And both they and those principles which are factinsensitive (understood as per the revised thesis), are true, when they are true, because of their responsiveness to normative facts, which are not expressed by principles.
